The Hidden Side Effects of the Space Shuttle
Regardless of what people may think today, the beginning of the space shuttle era was anything but pleasant insofar as government interagency relations went. By the time that DOT got the lead agency role, the entire interagency environment for space was getting pretty hostile. There may be some who will quibble with the description below, but research within the US Government archives should verify the general description. This certainly was what we (The Office of Commercial Space Transportation) encountered when we became the new kids on the block—there was a surrealistic component to this because we represented not our own interests but, instead, the interests of the private sector.
NASA was very wedded to its space shuttle. It was the means for NASA to become the only major player in space. At the time the shuttle was close to ready to come online, NASA had the Delta and Atlas launch vehicles. The US Air Force had the largest and most powerful launch vehicle, the Titan. Pre-shuttle, NASA launched domestic satellites and international satellites into space using the Delta and Atlas, and the US Air Force launched big, heavy satellites using the Titan. So in essence, there were two major launch operators and the US Air Force had the heaviest launch capability.
When the space shuttle was ready, NASA pulled an interagency end run and was able to get President Reagan to sign a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that made the space shuttle the exclusive Space Transportation System (STS) for the United States. NASA’s vision for the space shuttle was that it would the equivalent of a space taxi taking off into space at least once a week.
Therefore, no other forms of launches into space were necessary. The NSDD signed by the President announced that the Delta and Atlas production lines would be shut down when the space shuttle was operational. More importantly, it said the Titan production lines (which belonged to the Air Force) would be shut down later. Eventually, this meant that all expendable launch vehicles (ELV’s, a name coined by NASA to distinguish those “one-time shots into space” from the reusable and, allegedly, frequent-flying space shuttle) would be shut down and the US would rely on the space shuttle exclusively to get into space.
This did not sit well with the USAF, which did not want to be limited to a single access to space. Any problem with the shuttle and the USAF was grounded. And it did not want to rely exclusively on NASA. But the Air Force had been cut out of space because of NASA’s move and the days of the Titan rocket were limited.
The rocket manufacturers, McDonnell Douglas (Delta), Atlas (General Dynamics), and Lockheed Martin (Titan) were not happy about this either. By the time the President signed NSDD94 announcing the intent to create a private launch industry, the Delta and Atlas production lines had closed or were in the process of being closed. The science and art of rocket manufacturing was so refined and precise that neither company could assure that their vehicles would fly well once the assembly line had been dismantled.
Fortunately for the companies and the Air Force, Space Service Inc. (SSI) decided to conduct a private launch. Deke Slayton and his crew caught America’s imagination with the notion of a former astronaut launching a private rocket. And the idea of a flourishing private industry making rockets the way Ford and GM made automobiles captured the Nation’s attention. It also gave the Air Force and the companies a great angle. If space launches were privatized, the companies could get control of their rockets, and the Air Force would have multiple routes to space. It was a winner for everyone but NASA.
Once the idea caught on, NASA had no alternative but to join in the effort to create a private launch industry. When I joined the process for the selection of the lead agency, NASA was there at the table. As time would reveal, though, they might have been part of the process of selecting a lead agency, but their heart was far from supportive of commercial companies launching the commercial satellites of the day.
(I don’t think that NASA ever thought that the private industry represented any type of threat; the space shuttle was so superior that the ELVs, in their opinion, would simply disappear. They probably thought the private industry had no chance, and that they, NASA, were in the driver’s seat. In fact, NASA’s policymaking and energy were all directed at the success of the space shuttle without a thought to the commercial launch industry. That may be a harsh statement, but that was what I saw from our vantage point trying to promote those historical ELVs.)
It was not too much later after we got the lead agency role that we found out what a hardball player NASA was going to be vis-à-vis the private launch industry. One of the negative by-products of the decision to eliminate expendable launch vehicles was the impetus for the Europeans to create Arianespace. At one time, anyone in the world wanting to launch a commercial satellite had to go to NASA, and the satellite would be launched on a NASA ELV. When NASA started developing the space shuttle, it told everyone that if they wanted to go into space they had to do it aboard a shuttle, and schedules would be subject to the availability of the shuttle bay. This had the same effect on the Europeans as it did the USAF. Perhaps they were developing their own launch vehicle at the time, but when they were told that they would have to fly aboard the shuttle, it gave them a lot of energy to create Arianespace. Arianespace soon became a serious effective competitor to the shuttle and a major threat to the success of the US commercial launch industry. It later got to be such a problem that Arianespace pricing policy became a negotiation issue between the US Trade Representative and Europe.)
Because a successful commercial industry would eliminate the Air Force’s concern about dependency on NASA for access to space, the Air Force was our natural ally. NASA, on the other hand, was anything but an ally. It had gotten the President to declare the space shuttle as the launch system of the United States. That meant that all US government satellites would fly on the space shuttle, not commercial launch vehicles. In theory, this left commercial satellites and foreign satellites available to fly on US commercial launch vehicles. However, it was not too long before McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Lockheed were coming to the Office complaining that NASA was undercutting the commercial industry. It cost the companies between $60-80 million to launch a satellite. NASA was charging around $15 million to launch the satellite.
The battle over shuttle pricing was fought by Director Jenna Dorn, Don Trilling, Karlyn Daub, Carl Rappaport and others. (I am hopeful that they too will add their recollections to this website.) There were many interagency and White House meetings on the commercial launch pricing for the shuttle. In essence, DOT was arguing that NASA was charging marginal pricing to launch commercial satellites and in effect was subsidizing commercial satellite launches. NASA, on the other hand, despite the low launch rate of the shuttle, was arguing that the shuttle would soon be launching at regular weekly intervals and that the costs should be distributed over a large launch base. (Note: those familiar with airline and railroad economics know that pricing is highly dependent on how one distributes the operating and fixed costs.) Nothing equaled NASA’s power regarding space issues within the administration at this point in time. The space shuttle was America’s and Reagan’s darling. (Pro-commercial forces argued unsuccessfully within the administration. Later, Courtney Stadd testified before Congress using data produced by Phil Salen to show that, indeed, NASA was doctoring the pricing. Following his testimony, that information was out in the public and no longer shielded behind administration doors.)
My part of the program, on the other hand, represented the technical part of the business and my goal was to maintain good relationships with NASA because, in theory, technical and engineering discussions are not political. My contact in NASA had agreed that no matter what happened in the policy dimension, the technical/safety roles had to maintain cordial and cooperative relations. Of course, if DOT’s policy efforts were unsuccessful, there would be no technical side to worry about. Thus, we continued to coordinate on technical and safety topics.
For the first year, it was a very hostile environment for the industry and DOT, insofar as the relationship with NASA and shuttle pricing went. Interestingly, in the technical dimension, I was beginning to see data that suggested that the shuttle price was not going to be the major issue. By mid- 1985 I was beginning to see studies and data produced by the safety community that the space shuttle could have as high as a 1 in 4 chance of a catastrophic failure with each launch. I passed those studies around the office, but the studies were talking about something that hadn’t yet happened and might not happen; meanwhile, NASA was definitely undercutting the industry so it could fill its shuttle bay. (The hostile environment for the industry vis-à-vis McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics didn’t disappear until after Challenger exploded on take-off and the shuttle was grounded. Up to this time, neither company had sold a commercial launch.)
Although the Air Force was a DOT supporter in the context of the space shuttle pricing, it was not quite the case with respect to the companies and the use of the National Ranges such as Cape Canaveral, and Vandenberg AFB. In this case, the “hostile” environment was not due to intentional detrimental actions toward the industry, but rather a historical and cultural issue. We’ll address this later.