Cremains–A New Use for Space
Secrets of the Launch License: Part 1
Regulating Commercial Space Transportation: A New Frontier
A Regulatory Primer
Part 2: The Office of Commercial Space Transportation–Pre FAA
Part 1: The Office of Commercial Space Transportation–Pre FAA
Launch Hazards: Problems Getting Insurance
The Bumpy Path to the Launch Pad
The Hidden Side Effects of the Space Shuttle
Transferring the Export-Launch License to DOT
Executive Order 12465 versus Legislation
Adventures with Starstruck
Conflict as DOT Meets the Hill
Giving FAA and J Lynn Helms the Bad News
The Department of Transportation Gets the Nod!
- 1
- 2
My Regulatory Framework
The Spirit of St. Louis had a big impact on the commercial space regulatory program. This poster, mounted on a big 1 1/2 inch thick styrofoam block hung on my wall all during the time that I was directing the commercial space transportation regulatory program. It was prominently displayed where I could not possibly miss it, and every staff person, boss, or visitor whoc came to my office could not help but see it. It was a reminder to me that it was innovation, spirit, and risktaking that what made our country great. It also was a reminder that aviation became great at a time when there was minimal government role. It was a reminder to me that we could do huge damage if we did this job wrong, Later, after I went to head the FAA Logistics Center where I had been hired to do a turn-around, I kept it prominently on my office wall. Then it was to remind me that if you want to accomplish something large, you have to be willing to take the risks.
I had had enough experience with regulatory programs to know that what we did for commercial space transportation could shape its direction. It was really important that before any regulatory concepts, I had to have the basic principles in place so whatever we did, could be compared against those principles. I knew that we would not be able to “not regulate” but we could create as few burdens as possible, and try to open doors using the regulatory process where-ever possible. Even without written authority, we could talk about, encourage, and leave the door open to spaceports, crazy payloads, re-entry vehicles, and human space flight. Furthermore in Washington DC, power vacuums are filled quickly. Whenever there was a gap in the legislation that could be utilized by those less than friendly to the industry, the vacuum created by that gap had to be filled. It wasn’t about power. It was about trying to make sure no company ran into another SSI situation, regardless of the technology.
- The President’s Executive Order and Congress’ legislation explicitly gave DOT authority for commercial expendable launch vehicles (vehicles launched only once). However, as special as that authority was, it was shortsighted because even at that time there were those talking about reusable vehicles. In that era, driven by visions created by NASA and the US Air Force, neither the White House nor Congress could see that the authority granted to DOT was too narrow. However, among those of us given the opportunity to oversee the future of the new industry, we saw the mission broader. Hence, we called ourselves the “Office of Commercial Space Transportation”. More importantly, the regulatory program I was tasked to oversee had to focus from the outset on building a licensing program that included every possible version of space travel in the future.
- The commercial space industry had to be able to evolve in the directions it wanted, not the way that NASA, the Air Force, or any others thought it would or should. This meant that even the craziest ideas had to be permitted to be tested.
- Commercial spaceports were desirable and needed to be encouraged. Even unlikely sites were probably possible, even inland sites (a concept believed not possible in 1984). This meant that we would have to openly talk about the concept and encourage those ideas.
- Commercial transportation needed payload markets, and the more uses for space that entrepreneurs discovered, the bigger market. We would have to be open to the idea that space no longer could be treated as pristine and untouched by banal commercial applications, even perhaps ones that NASA or the Air Force previously thought as inappropriate.
- For the industry to mature, we would also have to take on a teaching role. It was readily apparent the three largest launch companies were not entrepreneurial, innovative pioneers, or wildly creative, and they would not push the boundaries of our authority. Instead the big three were government contractors who were still captive to NASA and Air Force direction. Thus we knew they would be compliant with those agencies “orders” or strong suggestions. Having worked with many other transportation industries, this one didn’t yet have the backbone that other transportation industries, like truckers, railroads, and airlines had, nor did they have the willingness to push back hard against government authority. For those companies, we would have use the regulatory process to industry to change it’s perspective of itself; this would include making them responsible for safety (even when using a government launch range), creating a way for them to push back against government launch range conditions, and actively encouraging ideas that moved their vehicles away from government facilities.
- Even though NASA, USAF, Congress, and virtually all the space community treated McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Martin Marietta as the “commercial launch industry”, we would have to keep first and foremost in our priorities the many smaller, emerging companies. We would have to give them equal or higher priority because they were the most vulnerable to the regulatory burden, and they could sink under the weight of our regulatory requirements. In addition, we considered it highly probable that the future of space transportation would emerge from these ideas that many considered to be flaky, or impossible.
- Extensive experience in the government had taught me that “I am here from the Government and I am here to help you”, is indeed an oxymoron. Although NASA and the US Air Force were alleged “friends” of the industry, in fact they actually often posed the greatest dangers to the industry. These agencies believed they knew it all; knew what was best for the industry; viewed space to be THEIR province; owned all the resources and money the industry needed to start; and would not hesitate to step in if they perceived the industry to be a threat or becoming too independent. (Examples: Motorolas Iridium constellation, NASA launches vs. commercial launches, and USAF range use policies.)
- Interagency success for the regulatory program was dependent upon OCST acting as if it had been on the block a long time, and not allowing itself to be pushed or compromised by either NASA or the USAF. Though DOT needed both agencies to be partners, and in some cases was required to coordinate with both agencies, DOT would need to set up it’s regulatory system in such a manner as to be able to be independent, and if necessary minimize the influence of the two huge space agencies.
- Having worked on many interagency projects before, I knew that this was going to use all the government interaction skills we could muster. Agencies are like living organisms—they have their own independent interests separate from their missions. (For example, NASA “supported” the new industry, but it was competing with industry using its space shuttle.) They have defense mechanisms, immune systems, nervous systems that respond to external stimuli, and these agencies respond negatively to what they perceive as threats. We, along with the new industry, were invading their space, and even as the heads of the agencies supported us, parts of their agencies would try to push us out.
- We knew were going to have to fight to establish credibility and to fight the notion that we brought nothing to the table. We were going to have to prove that of the “space safety experts” of the time were not experts about safety in general, but instead were experts in only their own safety approach. The risk we faced was that the first time we approved something that defied convention, the “experts” would challenge or undermine us. In order to counter that, the first order of business would be to prove the “experts” wrong (as in the insurance arena), and find the first safety pioneers of the space program and add them to our team.
- All regulators get out of hand. Although regulatory processes are necessary, regulators invariably end up going too far. Regulatory power is the ultimate form of power. Regulators get to make rules; they get invested in their rules; soon they cannot see beyond their rules. The best regulator is the regulator who hates regulating.
- It was going to be essential the regulatory program treat accidents and failures that did not affect the public’s safety, as part of the business. (This harkens back to the poster above: Charles Lindbergh was not the first to try to cross the Atlantic. He just happened to be the first who finally stayed failure free to get to the other side.) This included even commercial human space flight. The success of commercial aviation was in part due to the fact that passengers assumed their own risks to fly. The same had to be true for commercial space travel.
- The Commercial Space Launch Act didn’t cover everything, and we would have to do the same thing with the Act that we would have had to do had we been forced to use the Export Licensing as our authority. This meant we would have to creatively construct the rationale for how our authority worked. The reasons could be two close a gap so no other agency saw an authority vacuum, or sometimes to make the process work. Sometimes that would need to be done in conjunction with the attorneys, and sometimes it would be better to treat it as if there was no legal issue.
- Finally, it was inevitable, in my opinion, that the Office would eventually be moved to FAA, unless something was done to make that unnecessary. My personal goal was to get it to be recognized as its own transportation mode and get it established as its own operating administration (similar to the Pipeline and Hazmat administration or the motor carrier administration). However, having been responsible for DOT organizational design in a prior position, I knew that would be difficult until the office reached a critical mass. Thus, my main priority was to keep it out of FAA as long as possible, in order to give the office and regulatory program sufficient time to get on its own feet. If it had to ultimately go to FAA, then we had to establish a strong enough regulatory identity and philosophy to withstand the FAA culture.