Give Credit to NASA and the Space Shuttle
Although it captured the imagination of Americans everywhere, the 1982 SSI launch was not enough to create the impetus for commercializing space. At the time, it was a novelty. The companies which made NASA’s and the Air Force’s major launch vehicles were McDonnell Douglas (Delta), General Dynamics (Atlas) and Martin Marietta (Titan). They were very happy to be government contractors. Working for the government, these companies faced no competition, had guaranteed profits, and took no risks. There also was little interest within the government space community to encourage commercial space ventures. The government controlled access to space, and things were simpler if it stayed that way.
It was NASA’s own actions that inadvertently precipitated the drive to commercialize space launches. The same year SSI launched its rocket, NASA won a major space battle against the military. As part of its efforts to develop support for its shuttle program, NASA had succeeded in getting the President to approve and sign a National Space Policy that, among other things, eliminated all the US fleet of expendable launch vehicles (rockets) that had provided America’s access to space, including those used by the US Air Force.
While the public saw a serene and beautiful portrayal of space through NASA’s eyes, the didn’t know that behind the scenes there was a brutal interagency fight between NASA and the USAF. NASA had sold the White House on the concept of the Space Shuttle as a ” space taxi” that would fly into space almost weekly, and thus there was no other need for the “old fashioned” rockets. The result of this decision was that the Air Force’s Titan rocket, as well as NASA’s Delta and Atlas rockets, would be retired. The rocket manufacturing lines would be closed down. Actions to close the production of the Delta and Atlas had already begun. The Air Force Titan was scheduled to shut down later. The USAF would no longer have its own reliable alternative access to space.
This did not sit well with the military, which did not like the idea of its only access to space coming from NASA and its shuttle. Were anything to happen to the shuttle, the Air Force would have no access to space. It was no more acceptable to the vehicle manufacturers: McDonnell Douglas (Delta), General Dynamics (Atlas), and Lockheed Martin (Titan). Once their production lines closed, all that experience and technology would be lost, as well as the revenue those vehicles could generate.
America’s love of Deke Slayton’s private launch provided the perfect solution. The US Air Force, the three major launch vehicle manufacturers, and other proponents of commercial space activity combined efforts to persuade the White House to support a commercial space launch industry by allowing privatization of the current fleet of expendable launch vehicles. They also started selling the idea to Congress. If private operations were approved, it would mean that McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin could become commercial launch operators and sell rocket launches to satellite companies. A new industry would be born! What an American idea!
The idea quickly caught on. President Reagan announced that rocket launches involving expendable launch vehicles would be privatized and that a national security working group, comprised of NASA, DOD, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation (DOT), and other select agencies would be formed to address how this could be implemented.
Among other things, the national security-working group would select a “lead agency”. The “lead agency” concept at that time was to promote and facilitate the growth of a new industry. At the time, all regulatory responsibilities were vested in 18 other agencies. The role of the “lead agency” was to facilitate that regulatory maze. Neither USAF nor NASA wanted that role.
At the beginning, the national security-working group assumed that DOT would become the lead agency because it was responsible for transportation. In fact, the first national security-working group’s decision paper first showed FAA as the “lead agency”. The working group soon realized that selection of FAA would be a serious error because the working group had quickly learned from the FAA representatives on the working that FAA was a pretty heavy-handed regulator. DOT itself, however, was still a logical agency to become the promoter and facilitator for a new, emerging industry, if it could be persuaded not to put the function in FAA. (Congress and industry, however, had a different agency in mind, the Department of Commerce.)
However, after a short while, the working group lost its confidence in DOT as a lead agency candidate. Soon, within the working group, a competition would emerge between two cabinet agencies as to which department would get the job of aiding and supporting this new industry.